The War
Against Radical Islam: A Clash of Good versus Evil
October 1, 2005
When discussing foreign relations, many cite Samuel Huntington’s well-known work The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order. It began as an essay published in Foreign Affairs and the response to it was so dramatic that Huntington later dedicated an entire book to the topic, to discuss his view in greater detail. The essence of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations hypothesis is that differences between civilizations, rather than ideological differences, will dictate future conflicts. This view, which resonated so dramatically with the most astute foreign policy thinkers of the early 1990s, has now slowly made its way into the mainstream of how most people view foreign relations. Many will often take this view as a starting point and argue for or against it, or explain what needs to be tweaked in this hypothesis.
Andrew Harvey (Major, U.S. Army), Mr. Ian Sullivan, and Dr. Ralph Groves (Major, U.S. Army Reserve) have an interesting position on this topic. In their essay, “A Clash of Systems: An Analytical Framework to Demystify the Radical Islamist Threat,” their take is that Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations is not so much a predictive model of foreign relations, but rather one alternative for how we can package the current state of foreign affairs. In particular, their sights are set upon our relationship with the Arab and Muslim world. They explain that most Arabs and Muslims view the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as clashes of civilizations, but that we should characterize the current struggles as clashes of systems, to make our efforts more palatable to the civilians on the battlefield.
In a clash of civilizations, there is a fight against an outsider, an invader, a conqueror. In a clash of systems, the fight is an internal struggle, a revolution, liberation. In the former, we are most assuredly largely viewed as the enemy, whereas in the latter we can be either the enemy or the ally and benefactor. Clearly, the latter is the preferred manner in which we would like to be characterized. The current conflict that we are involved in throughout the world and especially in the Middle East resembles both a clash of civilizations and a clash of systems.
In Iraq and in Afghanistan, we are not waging wars against an insurgency. We are waging wars against a cancerous sub-culture of death that has taken root in many Arab and Muslim cultures; a sub-culture that views the western world as its enemy, and the United States in particular as the Great Satan. That resembles a clash of civilizations, though I think that it is more accurately called a clash of cultures. We have no significant differences with Arab or Islamic civilization that would bring us to war. Ask a Soldier who has spent significant time in actual combat in Iraq or Afghanistan - not a Soldier who has spent his time on a base - and you will most likely hear him say that most of the people like us. It is the vocal and energetic minority that wants to kill us – the subculture of death.
Iraq and Afghanistan are simply two pieces of ground in larger Arab and Muslim lands from which the culture of death draws its recruits, ideology, and strength. Removing Saddam Hussein was a critical step, but not the objective in Iraq. Removing the Taliban was a critical step, but not the objective in Afghanistan. The mission is to change the cultural landscape of the Arab and Muslim world. The missions will not be complete until regime change is complete. Regime change will be complete when there are self-sustaining mechanisms put in place to prevent, curb, or negate the spread of radical Islam in each country. In each case, the intended mechanism is a viable, democratic government. To that end, we could say that this is a clash of systems.
However, we are not clashing
with a system. To say that there is a clash as we establish a new
system would imply that we are fighting an insurgency, but our battles
in Afghanistan and Iraq are nothing of the sort. We are fighting Wahhabis
and other radical Islamists who have a fanatical vision of martyrdom.
The masterminds of the activity in Iraq are not former Ba'ath regime
goons. Zarquawi and his henchmen are not Ba'ath ideologues or people who
stood to lose anything by the de-Ba'athification process in Iraq.
Neither Osama bin Laden nor his legions of murderers are representative
of Arab or Muslim civilization. We are fighting a sub-culture within
the Arab world composed of people whose lives are given meaning by
fighting against the infidels and who consider themselves to be superior
to the apostate non-Wahhabis, by virtue of their dedication to waging
jihad in the militaristic sense of the word.
The radical Islamists do not want our civilization, our culture, or our
systems. They think that our civilization and our culture are
sinful and an affront to Islam, made ever more offensive by virtue of
its wide appeal and success. They want a theocracy and they want the world to bow to their
radical brand of shari'a. They know that we will not do so, so
they seek to destroy us. They do not oppose the establishment of
new Iraqi and Afghan governments any more than they oppose to anything
else that we are doing in those countries. They seek to kill us.
Period. It does not matter if we are attempting to establish or
disestablish a government. Our civilization is no more tasteless
to them than our secular system of governance. Selling our mission
as a clash of systems rather than a clash of civilizations is
nothing more than saying six of this versus half a dozen of that.
Harvey, Sullivan and Groves are probably correct, however, that selling this endeavor as a clash of systems to the majority of peaceful Arabs would be more palatable than the perception of it being a clash of civilizations. However, this difference would be negligible at best. It would still leave a bitter taste. It still paints us as the crusader or at least the meddling imperialists. The advantage that we would get by changing the perception of this war as a clash of systems rather than a clash of civilizations would certainly not be a worthwhile use of our time or energy.
Aside from the debate about the utility of such an IO (information operations) campaign to reshape our image in the eyes of the Muslim and Arab world, we must confront the reality that we are not very good at selling our viewpoint. Even if we assume that the idea of a clash of systems might sell well to the Arabs who live under tyranny and poverty and significantly alter the operating environment, how do we send that message without coming off as either ridiculously naïve or insincere and having ulterior imperialist motives? Major Ben Connable, a Division G-2 in the United States Marine Corps might have explained most clearly why it is difficult, if not impossible, to get our message out to the rest of the world:
“Our sense of moral superiority comes from a real desire to help others and do the right thing, but it also gets in our way when we have to deal with those that live by more nebulous rules. Our earnest overtures are seen as false and naïve instead of moral and brave. Europeans cannot believe that we would sacrifice so much in Iraq just to prevent a WMD attack and to help the Iraqi people, because they would never do it themselves. If they have a hidden angle, we must have one too.”
If altruism is such a foreign concept to Europeans, then just imagine how outlandish this must sound to someone who has only known oppression and poverty. Connable further explains the incredulity with which most Iraqis likely view our altruistic claims:
“Where you have been protected from invasion, martial law, and torture for nearly two centuries, we have experienced nothing but invasion, martial law, and torture for our entire lives. We have been in a state of almost constant warfare with either the US or with Iran… Because our lives are so brutal, we have almost no capacity to view the long term… Your talk about democracy and culture and prosperity mean little to people who are simply surviving.”
If we are to remain focused on our long-term strategy in the Middle East then making ourselves appear even more disingenuous is not the solution. The Arab people are survivors and live day to day. They do not scheme strategies into the unforeseeable future. Present yourself as a naïve philanthropist who has traveled the globe to bring peace and prosperity to their ravaged nation (or a new system) and they will play you like the fool that they perceive you to be. Present yourself as the warrior who has come to purge their country of the radical Islamists who threaten our nation. Give firm ultimatums and incentives for their cooperation. Then you are more likely to get the cooperation that you need.
Winning hearts and minds is not about charity work, handing out candy to children, or feel-good community improvements. Winning hearts and minds is a means of altering the behavior of the civilian populace in a given area to work to your advantage by whatever means are most effective, within the constraints placed upon us by our morals, values, and ethics. In a society that is shortsighted and focused largely on survival, any incentives and punishments must be immediately felt for actions that are clearly defined. Much to the chagrin of strategists and policy wonks, this is not something that we can effect through legislation, treaties, strategic initiatives, or impressive press briefings. This is something that can only be executed at the individual level. Winning hearts and minds is not the work of Generals and Colonels. It is dependent upon the dynamic personalities, creativity, and intellect of our young Lieutenants, Noncommissioned Officers, and enlisted Soldiers. Only they can truly win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, and only if empowered with the tools and authority to work with the Iraqi people to execute their mission as they see fit. In order for them to be successful, we must empower them with a tremendous amount of trust, authority, money, and faith. Centralized execution has no place in a hearts and minds campaign.
Neither regime removal nor winning hearts and minds in Iraq and Afghanistan are the desired end state of our missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Regime change in which we replace an offensive regime that gives aid to radical Islamists with a less offensive and viable regime that does not give aid to radical Islamists is the objective. Regime removal and winning hearts and minds are two critical steps toward that objective. Characterizing our efforts as a clash of civilizations or a clash of systems is an exercise in semantics. It is a good discussion for philosophers, strategists, policy wonks, and students to have. Where the rubber meets the road, it is irrelevant.
It is inconvenient that, on this postmodern battlefield, where our Soldiers are outfitted with thousands of dollars of weapons and equipment and have million-dollar weapon systems at their disposable with the touch of a button, our mission boils down to the most tedious, manpower intensive, time-consuming, and frustrating task of winning hearts and minds, one person at a time, one dollar at a time. For all of our bright ideas, gizmos, and visions of altruism, we must refocus on what our actual purpose in Iraq is. Our military is in Iraq and Afghanistan to painstakingly root out and destroy adherents of radical Islam; to kill or capture terrorists and those who assist them; to fundamentally change the Middle East so that it no longer breeds, harbors, or encourages radical Islamist ideologues who base their lives on the death and destruction that they can bring upon others.
A clash of systems? A clash of civilizations? If we are trying to figure out how to characterize this war, then let us be a little more direct and focused. IO are an important component of warfare, especially in the information age. However, there is no substitute for your enemy’s refuge being taken from him, his concealment being stripped away, his cover destroyed, his will to fight eroded, his chest pierced by the hot lead fired from your rifle. You cannot appeal to the idealism of a world that is in perpetual confrontation with brutal reality. Survivalists do not care what our long-term intentions are. They only care about their survival and their immediate gains. An IO campaign to tell them how noble our intentions are will only further erode our credibility. The side effect of realism is that one gains respect for power and force.
If we are to determine how we want this war characterized, we should characterize it as a war against radical Islam; mortal combat between our best, brightest, and bravest against their most evil, repulsive, and cowardly. The majority of peaceful Arabs can help us and be rewarded, they can aid our enemies and meet an uncertain fate, or they can sit idly and deal with the collateral structural and economic damage that is wrought upon their land. If the war is characterized in this manner, then the realists will side with the more powerful force and act accordingly. It is about time that we drop the altruism and idealism, and seize upon our role as the most powerful and dominant military force on this planet. We are not yet out to save the world. We are out to destroy our enemies. The world can wait.
- TJM
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